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AUDITING THE DEFENSE AGAINST CROSS SITE SCRIPTING 
IN WEB APPLICATIONS 
Lwin Khin Shar and Hee Beng Kuan Tan 
School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Block S2, Nanyang Technological University 
Nanyang Avenue 639798, Singapore, Republic of Singapore  
Keywords: Cross Site Scripting, Static Analysis, Code Auditing, Input Validation and Filtering. 
Abstract: Majority attacks to web applications today are mainly carried out through input manipulation in order to 
cause unintended actions of these applications. These attacks exploit the weaknesses of web applications in 
preventing the manipulation of inputs. Among these attacks, cross site scripting attack -- malicious input is 
submitted to perform unintended actions on a HTML response page -- is a common type of attacks. This 
paper proposes an approach for thorough auditing of code to defend against cross site scripting attack. 
Based on the possible methods of implementing defenses against cross site scripting attack, the approach 
extracts all such defenses implemented in code so that developers, testers or auditors could check the 
extracted output to examine its adequacy. We have also evaluated the feasibility and effectiveness of the 
proposed approach by applying it to audit a set of real-world applications.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent reports on security attacks to web 
applications consistently showed that many 
successful attacks are carried out by illegal input 
manipulation. Cross-site scripting (XSS) attack is 
one such common attack as the attackers inject 
carefully crafted malicious scripts through the input 
parameters of client-side web pages in order to cause 
unintended actions of the web applications and 
achieve the attackers’ purpose. Injected scripts can 
be all kinds of client-side scripts such as JavaScript, 
ActionScript, and VBScript.  
XSS attacks can cause web applications to 
perform unintended actions such as exposing clients’ 
confidential information to the attacker. The 
underlying problem is because those applications 
accept inputs from user and use those inputs in 
output operations such as display and database 
updates, without proper sanitization.  XSS attacks 
may come from non-persistent input sources such as 
form-fields and URLs. This form of attack is known 
as reflected XSS. Or they may come from persistent 
input sources such as database records and persistent 
beans. This form of attack is known as stored XSS. 
Therefore, to avoid security violations, it is 
important to guard against all kinds of inputs which 
can be manipulated by the attackers. XSS attacks 
could be conducted in numerous ways by injecting a 
wide variety of HTML tags (e.g., <script> 
hack(); </script>) and attributes (e.g., <b 
onmouseover =  alert (document.cookie) 
>). In order to circumvent most sanitization schemes 
used by web applications, more sophisticated XSS 
attacks could also be conducted by using various 
character encoding schemes. For example, using 
Base64 encoding scheme, <script>hack(); 
</script>  can be replaced with 
PHNjcmlwdD5oYWNrKCk7PC9zY3JpcHQ+Cg==. As 
such, it is important to ensure that sanitization 
schemes used by web applications cover all such 
XSS attack vectors.  
Basically, most web applications implement two 
type of sanitization mechanisms to defend against 
XSS attacks: (1) input validation; (2) input filtering. 
Input validation checks the user input against the 
user interface specifications whereas input filtering 
removes, replaces, or escape potentially dangerous 
characters such as “<”. But sanitization mechanisms 
often fail in protecting the applications because 
either it is hard to sanitize all complete set of 
malicious scripts or the implementation is 
inadequate. In some applications, users are allowed 
to input HTML tags. It makes the escaping routines 
irrelevant. As such, it is important to provide 
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 software testers or developers with comprehensive 
information about the security mechanisms 
implemented in code in order to be able to check 
their adequacy for XSS defense. 
To date, existing approaches mainly focus on 
dynamically preventing potential XSS attacks or 
statically identifying potential XSS vulnerabilities in 
web applications. In most cases, software project 
teams prefer their applications to be free from 
vulnerability risks and hence, they may want to 
perform software vulnerability audits from time to 
time. To the best of our knowledge, no approach has 
focused on providing the software testers or 
developers with necessary information about XSS 
defense features implemented in code to facilitate 
such audits. Hence, in this paper, we propose a novel 
code auditing approach that focuses on 
automatically extracting all possible XSS defenses 
implemented in code. The extraction is based on the 
possible coding patterns for implementing XSS 
defense. From the extracted output, one can examine 
its adequacy and identify the potential risks. 
2 THEORY FOR EXTRACTING 
XSS DEFENSE FEATURES 
FROM CODE  
The proposed theory is built on modeling of the 
possible code patterns of sanitization methods that 
prevent illegal input manipulation: (1) input 
validation; (2) input filtering.  
In this paper, the basic definitions of 
interprocedural control flow graph (CFG) are 
adopted from Sinha et. al (2001). The following 
gives further definitions used in this paper. 
In a CFG, a node x transitively references to a 
variable v defined/submitted at node y if there is a 
sequence of nodes, y = x0, x1, …, xn = x, and a 
sequence of variables v = v0, v1,…, vn, such that n ≥ 
1, for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, xj defines variable vj and 
references to variable vj-1, and any path from xj-1 to xj 
that does not repeat any loop is a definition-clear 
path with respect to {vj-1}.  
In a web application, a node u at which an input 
submitted by user can be referenced and u dominates 
all nodes w at which the input can also be 
referenced, is called input node. These inputs 
include both persistent and non-persistent types of 
inputs. Variables defined/submitted at an input node 
u are called input variables of u. For example, 
Figure 1 shows a JSP code snippet of Guestbook 
SignIn page and Figure 2 shows its CFG. In this 
CFG, node 1 and 6 are input nodes; guestname and 
rs are input variables of node 1 and 6 respectively. A 
variable o referenced in a node is called potentially 
vulnerable variable (pv-variable) if o is submitted 
at an input node or o is defined at a node that 
transitively references to input variable/s submitted 
at input node/s. In Figure 2, guestname and name are 
pv-variables of the node 5 and 11 respectively.  
A program path from an input node u to the exit 
node is called a prime input path of u if it does not 
repeat any loop and pass through u again. In a web 
application program, a statement that references at 
least one pv-variable and performs a HTML 
response operation is called a HTML operation 
statement (html-o-statement). In a CFG, the node 
that represents this statement is called a HTML 
operation node (html-o-node). In Figure 1, 
statements at line 5 and 11 are html-o-statements, 
and in Figure 2, node 5 and 11 are html-o-nodes. 
2.1 Extraction of Defense through 
Input Validation 
Let k be a html-o-node in a CFG. Throughout this 
section, we shall address k as a html-o-node. To 
prevent illegal manipulation of inputs referenced at 
k, it is common that predicate nodes are used to 
ensure that only inputs with legitimate values are 
allowed to be operated at k. Next, we shall define a 
terminology to characterize such node pattern. 
A predicate node d is called an input validation 
node (iv-node) for k if the following properties 
hold: 
1) Both k and d transitively reference to a common 
input variable of an input node u. 
2) A prime input path m of u, that follows one 
branch of d, passes through k; and no prime 
input path m’ of u, that follows the other branch 
of d, passes through k. 
In Figure 2, both html-o-node, node 5, and predicate 
node, node 2, transitively reference to the input 
variable, guestname, of the input node, node 1. 
Prime input paths of node 1 starting with (1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, …), which follow the branch (2, 3) of node 2, 
pass through node 5. No prime input path that 
follows the other branch (2, 6) of node 2 passes 
through node 5. Hence, node 2 is an iv-node for 
node 5. Likewise, the while-predicate node, node 8 
is also an iv-node for the html-o-node, node 11.   
Next, we shall next formalize the detection of 
unprotected html-o-nodes in Property 1, which can 
be proved directly from its definition. 
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 Property 1 – Unprotected Html-O-Node. If there 
is no input validation node for k such that both 
transitively reference to a common input variable v 
of an input node u, then k is unprotected from XSS 
attack through illegal manipulation of v.  
A path through a CFG is called a 1-path if it 
does not repeat any loop. Let Ω be the set of 1-paths 
through the CFG. The partition of 1-paths in Ω, such 
that paths which contain the same set of iv-nodes for 
k and follow the same branch at each of these nodes 
are put in the same class, is called the input 
validation partition (iv-partition) for k. In the 
CFG shown in Figure 2, {(entry, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9, 10, 11, 8, end), (entry, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, end), 
(entry, 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 8, end), (entry, 1, 2, 6, 
7, 8, end)} is the set of 1-paths. Hence, in this CFG, 
{{(entry, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 8, end), 
(entry, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, end)}, {(entry, 1, 2, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 11, 8, end), (entry, 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, end)}} is 
the iv-partition for the html-o-node, node 5; and 
{{(entry, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 8, end), 
(entry, 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 8, end)}, {(entry, 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, end), (entry, 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, end)}} is 
the iv-partition for the html-o-node, node 11.  
Next, we shall formalize the computation of 
valid and invalid conditions for a html-o-node in 
Property 2 and 3, which can be proved directly from 
the definitions of input validation node and input 
validation partition. 
Property 2 – Invalid Input Condition. IVCk = {C 
⏐ X is a class in the iv-partition of k such that there 
is a path in X which passes through some iv-nodes 
for k but does not pass through k; and C = the 
conjunction of all the branch conditions of branches 
at iv-nodes for k that any path in X follows} is the 
set of invalid input conditions for k. 
Property 3 – Valid Input Condition. VCk = {C ⏐ 
X is a class in the iv-partition of k such that there is 
a path in X which passes through some iv-nodes for 
k and also passes through k; and C = the conjunction 
of all the branch conditions of branches at iv-nodes 
for k that any path in X follows} is the set of valid 
input conditions for k. 
Note that for each class X stated in Property 2 
and 3, the conjunction of all the branch conditions of 
branches at iv-nodes for k that any path in X follows 
is identical.  
From the iv-partition computed for node 5, we 
compute according to Property 2 and 3 that IVC = {( 
!(guestname!=null && guestname.length()<20))} 
and VC={(guestname!= null && guestname.length() 
<20)} are the sets of invalid and valid input 
conditions for this html-o-node. IVC and VC for the 
html-o-node, node 11 can also be computed in a 
similar way. 
 
Figure 1: JSP code snippet for Guestbook SignIn. 
 
Figure 2: The CFG of the JSP code snippet. 
2.2 Extraction of Defense through 
Input Filtering 
For defending against XSS attack through a html-o-
statement, another alternative is to remove, replace, 
or escape any dangerous characters from inputs that 
may define the values of pv-variables referenced at 
this html-o-statement. This filtering approach is 
generally carried out by a sequence of statements 
that may influence the values of all pv-variables of a 
html-o-statement. We shall formalize a terminology 
to characterize such coding pattern. 
Potentially Vulnerable Input Filter (PV-Input 
Filter) for a html-o-statement k in a program P is a 
sequence F of following statements according to 
their order in P: 
1) All the statements at which a pv-variable of k is 
defined/submitted.  
2) Statements on which statements in F are data 
dependent.  
3) Statements on which statements in F are control 
dependent such that k is not transitively control 
dependent on these statements. 
For example, the sequence of following statements 
forms the pv-input filter for the html-o-statement at 
line 5 shown in Figure 1: 
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 1. String guestname=  
request.getParameter(“guestname”); 
4. guestname.replace(“<”, “&lt;”); 
Note that if a variable is not a pv-variable, it is 
impossible to manipulate its value to perform an 
XSS attack. This is because all possible values of 
non pv-variables can only be defined by the 
programmer. 
3 PROPOSED AUDITING 
APPROACH 
Based on the theory discussed, we propose a code 
auditing approach for auditing the XSS defense 
features implemented in web applications through 
the following two major steps: 
Step 1. Extract XSS defenses through input 
validation and input filtering automatically from 
code. 
Step 2. Examine the extracted output to determine 
its adequacy. 
The first step can be fully automated using 
interprocedural control flow and data flow between 
input nodes and html-o-nodes. The second step in 
the proposed approach examines whether the input 
validation and input filtering implemented for each 
html-o-statement is sufficient for defending it 
against XSS attack. This step is to be carried out 
manually by examining the codes extracted from 
Step 1 as explained in the followings. 
In examining the input validation codes, the 
unprotected html-o-statements from some input 
variables are highly vulnerable to XSS attack 
through those variables. Hence, they require special 
attention in examining their input filtering codes. 
Next, invalid and valid input conditions of each 
remaining html-o-statement can be checked against 
required input formats or specifications to examine 
the adequacy for XSS defense. In examining the 
input filters, one needs to first examine how the pv-
input filter for each html-o-statement is contributed 
to the XSS defense, and next determine its adequacy 
for XSS defense based on experience or using an up-
to-date set of coding guidelines that avoid XSS 
vulnerability (e.g., XSS prevention rules from 
OWASP (2010)). Program slicing can also be used 
to aid the comprehension of invalid and valid input 
conditions, and pv-input filter through slicing on 
associated variables and statements. 
Note that in addition to the statements related to 
the XSS defense, the extracted output may also 
include some other statements that do not serve any 
security purpose. Moreover, a pv-variable may not 
be vulnerable at all if it only references to input 
whose value can be defined only by the programmer 
(i.e., the database records or session variables read 
by the program may not contain user input data). 
Hence, one must study and comprehend the 
extracted statements to identify the portion that 
serves for XSS defense.  
4 EVALUATION 
4.1 Prototype Tool 
 
Figure 3: The architecture of XSSDE. 
We have prototyped a tool called XSSDE (XSS 
Defense Extractor) through the use of Soot (Soot, 
2008). The tool fully automates the extraction 
process in Step 1. Its architecture is shown in Figure 
3. It consists of two major modules: a program 
analyzer, and an input validation and filtering miner 
(IVF miner). Program analyzer uses Soot’s APIs to 
analyze Java programs. It takes the class files of a 
Java program as input and builds the CFG of the 
program for control flow and data flow analysis. IVF 
miner includes three sub-modules: an input 
validation extractor (IV extractor), a pv-input filter 
extractor (PVIF extractor), and a program slicer. For 
each html-o-node in a CFG, IV extractor extracts the 
set of valid and invalid input conditions of the html-
o-node and the set of ordered pairs of input variable 
and input node such that the html-o-node is 
unprotected from XSS attack through each input 
variable. Similarly, for each html-o-statement in a 
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 program, PVIF extractor extracts the pv-input filter 
for the html-o-statement. All the information 
extracted is printed in a report. Program slicer is a 
utility tool used for further comprehension of the 
extracted information in order to determine the 
adequacy of XSS defense implemented. It aids the 
comprehension of variables and statements involved 
in the information extracted through extracting a 
program slice according to a given criterion. 
4.2 Experiment 
To evaluate the proposed approach, we have 
compared our approach with Livshits and Lam’s 
approach (Livshits and Lam, 2005). In the 
experiment, two postgraduate students applied our 
approach and two other students applied Livshits 
and Lam’s approach on five open source systems 
obtained from GotoCode web site (GotoCode, n.d.). 
We have requested the two students to apply 
Livshits and Lam’s approach analytically since their 
prototype tool is not available to us. In applying our 
proposed approach, the two students performed Step 
1 through the use of the prototype tool XSSDE. As 
discussed in section 3, Step 2 is to examine the 
extracted output from Step 1 manually in order to 
determine its adequacy for XSS defense. To 
facilitate this step, we have provided the two 
students with a set of coding guidelines for XSS 
prevention which was obtained from the two reliable 
sources (OWASP, 2009; OWASP, 2010). In this 
evaluation, we aim to address the following two 
research questions: 
RQ1. Is the code auditing approach really 
necessary despite existing static approaches? 
RQ2. Is our approach effective in extracting all 
the XSS defense features implemented in programs 
and feasible in examining them to determine their 
adequacy?   
To answer the questions, we analyzed the 
statistics of the experiment results shown in Table 1. 
RQ1. Livshits and Lam’s approach accounted 
for 27% (158/582) false positive rate (it produced 
29% (12/41) false positive rate in their own 
evaluation in (Livshits and Lam, 2005)). Using a set 
of coding guidelines that avoid XSS vulnerability, 
both students applied the proposed approach and 
identified all the vulnerable cases accurately without 
any false positives. It was observed that majority of 
the actual vulnerable html-o-statements (424) arises 
from imperfect input filters used in the experimented 
systems. In this experiment, Livshits and Lam’s 
approach did not produce any false negative cases as 
we assumed that a complete vulnerability 
specification is provided by user. In general, this is 
not possible. At least in this experiment, we 
observed that the compared approach produces 
significant false positives and our proposed 
approach really helps in identifying actual XSS 
vulnerabilities. To further study the usefulness of the 
proposed approach, we plan to compare it with more 
recent static analysis approaches which may produce 
lower false positive cases. 
Table 1: Statistics of evaluation results. 
 
RQ2. Although Livshits and Lam’s approach 
extracts data flow traces associated with each 
vulnerability point, clearly it missed out essential 
XSS defense features implemented. In contrast, we 
have confirmed that the proposed approach 
completely extracted all XSS defense features 
implemented. Of the total codes written, Livshits 
and Lam’s approach and our proposed approach 
extracted 11.6% (3590/30952) and 16% 
(4940/30952) respectively. Though the proposed 
approach extracted more lines of codes (LOCs) 
including those that are not related to XSS defense, 
we observed that manual examination process is still 
very much feasible for these sizes of the applications 
experimented. In future work, we plan to test the 
feasibility of the proposed approach based on larger-
sized web applications. 
5 RELATED WORK 
Many security researches to prevent XSS attacks are 
mostly dynamic approaches. There are two types of 
dynamic approaches; server-side detection and 
client-side detection. Server-side detection 
approaches generally set up a proxy between client 
and server, and check whether the input parameters 
in HTML request contain any malicious scripts 
(Kruegel and Vigna, 2003), or the input parameters 
are used in the scripts of HTML response (Ismail et 
al., 2004; Johns et al., 2008; Bisht and 
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 Venkatakrishnan, 2008), or the scripts of HTML 
responses are actually intended by the application 
(Johns et al., 2008; Bisht and Venkatakrishnan, 
2008).  
Client-side detection approaches are proposed 
mainly to be used and deployed by the clients. Beep 
(Jim, Swamy and Hicks, 2007) provides the client’s 
browser with security policies (e.g., a set of 
legitimate scripts and HTML content where 
malicious scripts may occur) and modifies the 
browser such that it is capable of preventing 
illegitimate scripts from being executed.  Noxes 
(Kirda et al., 2009) acts as a personal firewall which 
detects potential XSS attacks based on filter rules 
generated automatically or manually by clients. 
Filter rules are basically the whitelist and blacklist of 
url links. Blueprint (Louw and Venkatakrishnan, 
2009) takes over the browser’s parsing decision on 
untrusted HTML contents to ensure that the resulting 
parse trees contain no script. Blueprint then embeds 
model interpreter in corresponding web pages such 
that the client’s browser could reconstruct those 
parse trees.   All the above approaches incur runtime 
overheads due to the use of proxy and interception 
of HTTP traffic. Some also introduce technical 
difficulties in setting up, configuring and deploying 
of their systems. Hence, they may not be useful for 
novice users and some who prioritize performance.  
In software testing, there are input validation 
testing (IVT) approaches that could uncover some 
XSS vulnerabilities in the programs (Hayes and 
Offutt, 2006; Li et al, 2007; Liu and Tan, 2009). 
These approaches generate test cases with valid and 
invalid inputs either identified from specification 
(Hayes and Offutt, 2006; Li et al, 2007) or extracted 
from code (Liu and Tan, 2009). However, IVT 
approaches are not suitable for checking the 
adequacy of the input validation codes. Since even 
imperfect or incorrect input validation codes could 
detect some malicious inputs, IVT approaches may 
not reveal the weaknesses of those validation codes.  
Works on the identification of XSS 
vulnerabilities in web applications are mainly based 
on static analysis techniques. They check whether 
tainted data reaches sensitive program points 
without being properly sanitized, using flow-
sensitive, interprocedural and context-sensitive data 
flow analysis (Livshits and Lam, 2005; Jovanovic et 
al., 2006; Xie and Aiken, 2006). Pixy (Jovanovic et 
al., 2006) enhances the accuracy by aliasing.  
However, these approaches do not check the custom 
sanitization functions (either they conservatively 
assume that all those functions return unsafe data or 
user explicitly states the correctness of the 
functions). As a result, even Pixy produced 50% 
false positive rate (Jovanovic et at., 2006). 
There are static analysis approaches which check the 
adequacy of sanitization functions (Balzarotti et al., 
2008; Wassermann and Su, 2008). Based on string 
analysis techniques, they use blacklist comparison 
approach to check whether tainted strings may still 
contain the blacklisted characters at sensitive 
program points after passing through sanitization 
functions. However, Wassermann and Su’s current 
tool cannot handle complex codes and some of 
PHP’s string functions (Wassermann and Su, 2008). 
Saner (Balzarotti et al., 2008) requires dynamic 
analysis to identify the false positives produced by 
static analysis phase.  
The similarity between the above static 
approaches and our approach is that the 
vulnerabilities identified by them may serve as 
pointers for auditing the XSS defense features 
implemented in the programs. However, they do not 
extract all the statements that contribute to the XSS 
defenses. The results of those static approaches 
show that false positives are common due to their 
conservative nature. Most of the above approaches 
learnt those false positive cases through manual 
inspection on identified vulnerabilities. Hence, it 
supports the main point of our proposed approach 
that manual code auditing is necessary. However, 
manual inspection on the whole system would be 
labor-intensive, costly, and error-prone. Therefore, 
we propose the code auditing approach that focuses 
on comprehensively extracting the security 
mechanisms implemented in code in order to 
facilitate the manual code audits.  
In fact, the proposed approach and the above 
static approaches compliment each other.  Because 
the tools implemented by most of the above static 
approaches automate the potential XSS vulnerability 
identification process and our XSSDE tool 
automates the XSS defenses extraction process, they 
could be used together for more efficient code 
auditing process. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Cross site scripting is one of the most common 
security threats to web applications. Although 
current dynamic analysis approaches are generally 
effective, users may not want to overcome their 
technical issues such as configuration, deployment 
and runtime overheads. Moreover, they also do not 
identify the XSS vulnerabilities in the applications. 
Existing static analysis approaches also lack 
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 accuracy in identifying XSS vulnerabilities, and 
therefore they cannot avoid the code auditing 
requirement. Hence, we propose a novel approach 
for extracting XSS defense features implemented in 
code to facilitate both examination and auditing 
processes. 
In future work, we plan to study on effective 
coding techniques for preventing XSS attack and 
generalize them as guidelines so that one could use it 
in examining the adequacy of extracted XSS defense 
features. We also plan to evaluate our approach 
against more recent or better approaches based on 
the experiments on both open source and industrial 
applications.  
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